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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici Curiae are law professors at universities across the United States and are experts in
family law, adoption law, and constitutional law. James G. Dwyer, the Arthur B. Hanson
Professor of Law at William & Mary School of Law, drafted the brief. Professor Dwyer is a
nationally-renowned expert on the constitutional rights of parents and children. He has authored
four books on the law of child rearing, including THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
(Cambridge University Press 2006); a family law textbook; and dozens of articles and book
chapters on the rights of parents and children, including A Constitutional Birthright: The State,
Parentage, and Newborn Persons, 56 U.C.L.A. LAW REVIEW 755 (2009) and The Child
Protection Pretense: States’ Continued Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 407 (2008).
The other signatories are J. Herbie DiFonzo, Professor of Law at the Maurice A. Deane
School of Law, Hofstra University; Jennifer A. Drobac, Professor of Law at the Robert H.
McKinney School of Law, Indiana University – Indianapolis; Deborah L. Forman, Professor of
Law and J. Allan Cook & Mary Schalling Cook Children’s Law Scholar at Whittier Law School;
Marsha Freeman, Professor of Law at the Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law, Barry University;
Ellen Marrus, George Butler Research Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Children,
Law & Policy at the University of Houston Law Center; John E.B. Myers, Professor of Law at
the McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; and Professors Deborah Paruch and
William Ladd of the Juvenile Appellate Clinic at the University of Detroit Mercy School of Law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals panel (hereafter “the division”), in its now-vacated decision of
August 22, 2013, invoked Santosky v. Kramer in support of an assumption that legal parents
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facing termination have a “fundamental right” at stake in a trial court’s decision between
competing adoption petitions. On the basis of that assumption, the division concluded that the
trial court must decide in accordance with parents’ wishes unless adoption by the applicant
whom the parents prefer would inherently be detrimental to the child. The division appeared
also to conclude, based on the same assumption, that the family court should have disregarded
the impact on the children of disrupting their attachment relationship with the persons who have
raised them for the past six years. That assumption and those two conclusions are mistaken.
Santosky does not support the division’s assumption about parental rights, nor does any
other Supreme Court decision. Neither the specific holdings nor the underlying premises of the
Court’s various strands of parents’ rights jurisprudence support attributing to parents whose
children are in foster care any right in connection with selection among adoption applicants. As
a matter of policy, the District might conclude that it is appropriate to give parents’ view some
consideration, but no parental constitutional right compels it to do so.
Further, the division failed to recognize that children, like adults, possess a constitutional
right against the state’s destroying their home life and established relationships. The
fundamental Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right of intimate association protects the children
in this case, at least to the extent of requiring that any court contemplating severance of their
attachment relationships with R.W. and A.W. give substantial weight to the harm it would
thereby inflict on them.
ARGUMENT
Parental constitutional rights are more limited than the division assumed, and they have
no role to play in this case. Specifically, there is no federal doctrinal support for ascribing to
parents a constitutional right to decide who will assume the parental role when their own parental
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status is terminated for inability properly to care for their offspring. The reasoning underlying
the Supreme Court’s several child rearing doctrinal lines leads to an opposite conclusion.
Conversely, children in long-term foster care do have a constitutional right that constrains
a court’s choice as to who will adopt them. The fundamental constitutional right of intimate
association precludes the state from destroying an attachment relationship that a child has
developed during a long period of foster care without taking into account the harm this would
inflict on them. The foster care situation is unusual; it typically begins with an intention for it to
be temporary. However, at some point and under certain conditions, the child’s relationship with
foster parents who wish to adopt must command constitutional protection. The protection is not
absolute, but it does require that a court give appropriate weight to a child’s interest in
continuing that relationship, and it is stronger when the alternative for a child is not return to a
parent but rather adoption by some other non-parent.
I.

There is No Constitutional Right to Decide Who Replaces You as a Parent
The division began its review of the trial court’s decision in favor of R.W. and A.W. with

this set of statements:
Even when biological parents have not been “model parents,” they have a
“fundamental liberty interest ... in the care, custody, and management of their
child[ren]” and a “vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their
family life.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). Because of the
fundamental rights at issue when biological parents, with parental rights intact,
consent to an adoption petition in a contested adoption proceeding, “the trial court
cannot merely weigh the competing adoption petitions against one another, as if
they began in equipoise.” In re K.D., 26 A.3d at 778. Thus, the adoption petition
of the biological parents’ chosen caregiver can only be denied if it can be shown
by clear and convincing evidence that placement with that caregiver is “clearly
contrary” to the best interests of the children, rather than simply not in the
children’s best interests.
The division’s analysis of the substantive issue in this case thus rested on an assumption
about constitutional law, one tied to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Santosky v. Kramer.
Yet the quotation from Santosky makes evident that the decision is irrelevant to the substantive
3
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issue. Santosky concerned the procedural protections legal parents receive in connection with a
state’s decision never to return children to their “care, custody, and management” and instead
permanently to end “their family life” with those children. It says nothing about substantive
rights of parents, and it is irrelevant to a choice between adoption applications. In fact,
statements of the Supreme Court in Santosky and in other doctrinal areas relating to parenthood
make plain that the division’s supposition that the biological parents in this case have a
fundamental right at stake in choice of adoptive parents was mistaken.
The Court has recognized parenthood-related constitutional rights in three contexts:
A) the procedural rights of legal parents in termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings;
B) the rights of unwed biological fathers to become legal parents, and C) the substantive rights of
custodial legal parents to direct particular aspects of children’s upbringing, such as schooling.
The first two of these doctrinal lines concern rights to be in a legal relationship with a child,
whereas the third concerns parental control rights within established and intact custodial parentchild relationships. The third doctrinal line, insofar as it addresses parental decision making
power, is actually of greatest potential relevance to the substantive issue in this case. Regardless,
none of the Court’s decisions in any of these contexts supports attributing to non-custodial legal
parents a constitutional right to select someone else to be a child’s legal parent.
A. Supreme Court Precedent Concerning Termination of Parental Rights Does Not
Support the Notion that Parents Whose Child is in Foster Care Have a
Constitutional Right to Decide Who Adopts the Child
The Supreme Court has issued three decisions relating to involuntary termination of
parental rights (TPR) proceedings. Santosky (right to heightened evidentiary standard), Lassiter
v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (right to appointed counsel), and M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (right to appeal a TPR without payment of record preparation fees),
all addressed only procedural rights. As such, they are not directly relevant to the substantive
issue in this case – that is, the choice between adoption petitions.
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process analysis typically begins, though, by
assessing the importance of the substantive interest at stake. In all three Supreme Court
4
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decisions relating to TPR, the parental interest at stake was not one in controlling some specific
aspect of a child’s life, and certainly not in deciding who will adopt a child presently in foster
care. What was at stake was rather the core parental interest in remaining a child’s legal parent
and thereby preserving the chance to gain custody and establish a family life with the child. That
interest is not at stake in this case in connection with the choice between adoption applicants.
In Santosky and M.L.B., the Court did characterize the parental interest at stake as
“fundamental,” but it was only the primary and paradigmatic parental interest in simply
occupying the role of parent in a child’s life that the Court characterized as such. After stating
that parental interests do not entirely “evaporate” when the state removes maltreated children
from parents’ custody, the Santosky Court stated that what parents in this situation retain,
specifically, is their “interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. See also M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116-17 (“M. L. B.'s case, involving the
State’s authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond, demands the close consideration the
Court has long required when a family association so undeniably important is at stake.”), 121
(“In contrast to loss of custody, which does not sever the parent-child bond, parental status
termination is ‘irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]’ of the most fundamental family relationship.”)
(quoting Lassiter); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (“Here the State has sought not simply to infringe
upon that interest but to end it. If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of
deprivation.”). There is neither logical nor textual basis for extending what the Court said about
that core interest in remaining a parent to everything relating to a child’s life as to which a parent
might have a preference, and especially not to a paradigmatically state function like approving
petitions for adoption.
Moreover, the Santosky Court predicated its conclusion as to the procedural protection
constitutionally required in the fact-finding stage of a state-initiated TPR proceeding on an
assumption that the parent’s interests are at that point entirely congruent with those of the child,
and therefore that these protections served the child’s welfare as well as the parents’ desire. The
Court was careful to avoid any suggestion that the parents’ rights could operate contrary to the
5
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best interests of children. See id. at 760-61 (“After the State has established parental unfitness at
that initial [factfinding] proceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional stage that the
interests of the child and the natural parents do diverge. But until the State proves parental
unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of
their natural relationship. Thus, at the factfinding, the interests of the child and his natural
parents coincide to favor use of error-reducing procedures.”); id. at 766 (“‘Since the State has an
urgent interest in the welfare of the child, it shares the parent’s interest in an accurate and just
decision’ at the factfinding proceeding.”) (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27) (emphasis in
original). In contrast, in this case the division implicitly conceded a conflict of interests between
the children’s welfare – in particular, the harm they would incur from severance of their
attachment relationship with R.W. and A.W. – and the biological parents’ preference.
The Santosky Court went on to suggest that once the state proves unfitness by clear and
convincing evidence, whatever constitutional rights parents did retain following the initial child
protection removal do vanish, and at that point the focus of state attention rightfully shifts to the
child’s interests, unconstrained by any right of the unfit parents. Id. at 761 (referring to foster
parents’ ability to make their case for permanent custody “at the dispositional stage of a stateinitiated proceeding, where the judge already has decided the issue of permanent neglect and is
focusing on the placement that would serve the child’s best interests.”), 767 n.17 (“Any parens
patriae interest in terminating the natural parents’ rights arises only at the dispositional phase,
after the parents have been found unfit”). In short, only as to an unfitness determination do
parents have any recognized constitutional rights in connection with a TPR, and the rights the
Court has recognized in that context are only procedural ones.
Finally, Santosky, Lassiter, and M.L.B. all addressed state-initiated proceedings to
terminate parental rights, and the Santosky Court suggested that a different constitutional
analysis would apply in a proceeding initiated by foster parents or other private parties who wish
to adopt a child. Id. at 761 (“However substantial the foster parents’ interests may be, they are
not implicated directly in the factfinding stage of a state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding
6
43112214_1

against the natural parents. If authorized, the foster parents may pit their interests directly
against those of the natural parents by initiating their own permanent neglect proceeding.”). For
that reason as well, Santosky does not support the division’s assumption about parents’ rights.
B. The Unwed Father Precedents Support A Conclusion that A.H. and T.L. Have
No Constitutional Right to Decide Who Adopts A.L. and Ta.L.
In the 1970s and early 80s, the Supreme Court decided three cases in which a biological
parent was attempting to block adoption of a child by a biologically-unrelated person. These
cases involved step-parent adoption petitions opposed by unwed fathers who had not yet
established paternity, so they differed in significant ways from the present case. But two aspects
of the Court’s reasoning in those cases are worth noting.
First, the Court predicated rights on social, not merely biological, family relationships. In
the one case in which the biological father succeeded in blocking the step-parent adoption,
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), the biological father had a substantial relationship
with the child and was seeking to assume custody himself, not simply dictate who else might
raise the child. The Court emphasized “the importance in cases of this kind of the relationship
that in fact exists between the parent and child.” 441 U.S. at 382, 393 n.14; see also id. at 397
(“Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and
child. They require relationships more enduring.”); cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(ascribing to an unwed father who had participated in raising his children for many years and
who wished to continue custody of his children a constitutional right to prove his fitness and
thereby acquire legal parent status).
In the other two cases, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), and Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Court concluded that the biological fathers had no fundamental right to
become legal parents themselves or prevent someone else from adopting, because they had not
demonstrated commitment to the responsibilities of child rearing, did not have a substantial
relationship with the children at issue, and were not seeking custody for themselves. See
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (“this is not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or
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sought, actual or legal custody of his child”); Lehr, 463 at 257 (“the rights of the parents are a
counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed”); id. at 261 (“The difference between the
developed parent-child relationship that was implicated in Stanley and Caban, and the potential
relationship involved in Quilloin and this case, is both clear and significant.”); id. at 261 n.17
(acknowledging “the constitutional importance of the distinction between an inchoate and a fully
developed relationship”); id. at 266-67 (“the existence or nonexistence of a substantial
relationship between parent and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights of the
parent and the best interests of the child”); cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-24
(1989) (plurality opinion) (interpreting prior Court decisions relating to rights of unwed
biological fathers as respecting “the relationships that develop within the unitary family”).
Simply wanting to prevent someone else from becoming a legal parent and custodian of a child is
not an interest that receives constitutional protection.
Second, the Court has explicitly endorsed the position that the state may approve an
adoption by an existing non-relative caregiver based simply on a finding that doing so is in the
child’s best interests, regardless of a non-custodial biological parent’s objection, even if that
biological parent is fit and seeking parental status for himself. The Quilloin Court stated:
Nor is this a case in which the proposed adoption would place the child with a
new set of parents with whom the child had never before lived. Rather, the result
of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit already in
existence, a result desired by all concerned, except appellant. Whatever might be
required in other situations, we cannot say that the State was required in this
situation to find anything more than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation,
were in the “best interests of the child.”
434 U.S. at 255; see also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 259 (“The trial court [in Quilloin] found adoption by
the new husband to be in the child’s best interests, and we unanimously held that action to be
consistent with the Due Process Clause.”); Guardianship of Ann S., 45 Cal. 4th 1110, 1129
(2009) (“Quilloin demonstrates that the best interest of the child is a constitutionally permissible
basis for terminating parental rights in some circumstances.”). If a best-interest finding is a
constitutionally sufficient basis for rejecting a fit biological parent’s request to serve as a legal

8
43112214_1

parent himself, then surely it is a constitutionally sufficient basis for rejecting a biological
parent’s preference as to someone else serving as a legal parent.
C. Parental Constitutional Control Rights Are Limited in Scope and Power
The Supreme Court has decided several cases attributing to legal parents a constitutional
right to some authority over certain aspects of children’s upbringing. Importantly, all involved
fit legal parents whose children were living with them in intact families. Moreover, none
extended the parental control right to a decision even remotely like choosing substitute parents.
Further, none established a rule that what parents want must be inherently harmful for the state to
insist on something else for a child. Rather, these cases at most established that the state must
presume what fit custodial parents wish for their child is in the child’s best interests, putting on
the state a modest burden to show that what the state requires is actually better for the child. In
addition, all the Court’s decisions relating to parental control rights have confirmed the authority,
responsibility, and compelling interest of the state to protect and promote children’s wellbeing.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925), involved state regulation of private schooling. Parents were not parties, but the Court
referred to parental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment as partial justification for
invalidating the regulations (prohibition of instruction in German in Meyer, prohibition of private
schooling altogether in Pierce). The Court applied rational basis review in both cases, finding
that neither prohibition served any legitimate state interest. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400,
403; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. In both cases, the Court emphasized that the state had failed to
show any detriment to the children would result from the parents’ choices regarding schooling
relative to what the state sought, and that states are constitutionally free to oversee children’s
education in private schools in order to protect children’s educational interests. See Meyer, 262
U.S. at 403 (“there seems no adequate foundation for the suggestion that the purpose was to
protect the child’s health”); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (noting that nothing in the record indicated
any educational deprivation of private school students); id. (“No question is raised concerning
the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise, and examine
9
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them, their teachers and pupils.”). See also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257 (“the Court has emphasized
the paramount interest in the welfare of children”).
Two later cases, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding an ordinance
prohibiting involvement of children in distributing religious pamphlets on streets at night) and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding Amish parents are constitutionally entitled to
exemption from compulsory schooling laws for their children after eighth grade), involved Free
Exercise Clause as well as substantive due process claims to parental power. The Court in both
cases indicated that non-religious parental child-rearing preferences by themselves give rise to
no constitutional right to resist reasonable child welfare laws. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 (“Against
these sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, stand the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children, and the state’s assertion of authority to that end, made here in a manner
conceded valid if only secular things were involved.”), 166 (“Acting to guard the general interest
in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control. Yoder, 406
U.S. at 215–16 (“A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a
barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations .
. . Giving no weight to such secular considerations, however, we see that the record in this case
abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter
of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction.”) Indeed, even when religious
belief is at stake, the state constitutionally may act contrary to parents’ wishes if necessary to
protect children’s wellbeing. Id. at 233–34 (“To be sure, the power of the parent, even when
linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation...if it appears that parental decisions
will jeopardize the health or safety of the child.”); id. at 230 (“This case, of course, is not one in
which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order,
or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred.”).
The Court’s most recent decision concerning custodial parents’ control rights, Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), addressed a situation somewhat more like that in this case. A
custodial mother asserted a parental constitutional right to control her child’s relationship with
10
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third parties – in that case, paternal grandparents. The plurality decision determined that
Washington State went too far in ordering substantial grandparent visitation without according
any deference to the custodial mother’s view that less visitation time would be best for the
children. In a plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor characterized the “liberty interest” of parents
that the Substantive Due Process Clause protects in stronger terms than the Court had done in its
prior cases in this doctrinal line, beginning her analysis by invoking “the fundamental right of
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Id. at 66.
However, the plurality emphasized that the mother was a custodial parent whose fitness
was not in any doubt. Id. at 67 (expressing concern that “in the State of Washington a court can
disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation”) (emphasis in
original), 68 (“the Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that Granville was an unfit
parent. That aspect of the case is important, for there is a presumption that fit parents act in the
best interests of their children.”), 68-69 (“so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her
children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions
concerning the rearing of that parent’s children”). See also id. at 100-101 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“a fit parent’s right vis-a-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-a-vis
another parent or a de facto parent may be another.”). Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979) (holding that Georgia’s procedures for committing a juvenile to a psychiatric facility did
not violate the juvenile’s rights, and stating: “The law’s concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. More important, historically it has
recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children. As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality may rebut what the
law accepts as a starting point; the incidence of child neglect and abuse cases attests to this.”).
Further, the plurality concluded that the mother’s constitutional right required merely that
her view about third-party visitation receive “some special weight.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71. See
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also id. at 69 (“The problem here is not that the Washington Superior Court intervened, but that
when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to Granville’s determination of her daughters’ best
interests. More importantly, it appears that the Superior Court applied exactly the opposite
presumption.”). The plurality expressly declined to establish a harm standard – that is, a rule that
the state must defer to a custodial parent’s wishes about visitation unless it can prove this would
be harmful to the child. Id. at 73. See also id. at 85-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“that the
Federal Constitution requires a showing of actual or potential ‘harm’ to the child before a court
may order visitation continued over a parent’s objections—finds no support in this Court’s case
law”).
In sum, Supreme Court doctrine articulating a Fourteenth Amendment right of parents to
control some aspects of children’s upbringing has attributed such a right only to fit custodial
parents actively raising their children and only in a few contexts – schooling, religious
proselytizing, and third-party visitation; has treated that right as a relatively modest one,
requiring some presumption in favor of a fit custodial parent’s judgment about a child’s best
interests; and has emphasized the power of the state to override parental wishes if the state has
substantial basis for believing this will serve children’s wellbeing.
Conversely, the Court has never suggested that even fit custodial parents are
constitutionally entitled to presumptive control over every aspect of children’s lives; that the
state must defer to parents if it cannot show what the parents want is inherently harmful, rather
than simply worse for a child than what the state seeks; nor that parents can be constitutionally
entitled to a result contrary to a child’s wellbeing. Cf. In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413, 419 (D.C. 2009)
(“To be sure, at the end of the day, the paramount consideration must of course be the best
interest of the child. The rights of even fit parents ‘are not absolute, and must give way before
the child’s best interests.’”) (citations omitted).
This line of constitutional decisions thus yields the conclusion that the trial court in this
case was absolutely free as a matter of federal constitutional law to choose between the
competing adoption petitions solely on the basis of what would be in the children’s best interests,
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and in doing that to consider any and every way in which denying the petition of A.W. and R.W.
and instead granting the petition of E.A. could make the children worse off than they currently
are, including the harm arising from severing their attachment relationship with A.W. and R.W.
This conclusion gains further support from lower court decisions and agency practices in
contexts more closely resembling the present one. See., e.g., In re Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670,
682 (D.C.,1993) (“rights of natural parents to bring up their children . . . must give way before
the child’s best interests. . . . Thus, contrary to appellant’s assertion, a finding of parental
unfitness is not a constitutional prerequisite to granting an adoption petition notwithstanding lack
of parental consent.”); Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137 (Tenn. 2002) (holding that if there has
been a valid initial order placing custody of a child in a non-parent, parents seeking to change
custody to themselves do not enjoy the “superior rights” accorded parents seeking to prevent a
child’s initial removal from their custody, even if the parents had voluntarily surrendered custody
to the non-parent, because “the child’s interest in a stable and secure environment is at least as
important, and probably more so, than the parent’s interest in having custody of the child
returned”); id. (“Most other jurisdictions addressing this issue have largely concluded that the
superior rights doctrine is not applicable when a natural parent seeks to modify a custody
arrangement [with a non-parent] established by a valid order. Instead, these courts focus upon
whether the change in custody would be in the best interests of the child.”); C.R.B. v. C.C., 959
P.2d 375, 380 (Alaska 1998) (“Having once protected the parent’s right to custody [in an initial
proceeding to transfer custody to a non-parent], at the risk of sacrificing the child’s best interests,
we should not then sacrifice the child’s need for stability in its care and living arrangements by
modifying those arrangements more readily than in a parent-parent case.”).
Obviously, the routine state practice of removing children from parental custody because
of maltreatment or incapacity entails a great diminishment of parental authority and control over
the children’s lives. Parents are not deemed to have a constitutional right to decide or even
influence the decision as to who the foster parents will be. Cf. Guardian ad Litem Program v.
R.A., 995 So.2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting a father’s motion to change
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placement of his daughter from foster parents to the paternal grandmother, and stating that
“where a child has been declared dependent, it is the trial court, not the parents whose child has
been declared dependent, who must decide what is in the best interest of the child.”).
Recognizing such a right could have a crippling effect on the foster care system.
Indeed, even as to parents who are non-custodial because of dissolution of their
relationship with a child’s other parent, rather than because of any maltreatment or incapacity,
courts generally deny that they are constitutionally entitled to control the course of their
children’s lives. At most, they have a constitutional right to maintain contact with a child
through visitation. See David Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 1461, 1475 (2006) (“a survey of court decisions across a range of topics
shows considerable reluctance to recognize constitutional rights on the part of non-custodial
parents”), 1480 (“if non-custodial parents aspire to more than a bare minimum of access to a
child--to assert, for instance, their views about how their children should be raised or educated-the courts are notably less receptive.”) (citations omitted). Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (holding that a non-custodial parent lacked standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a school district’s policy requiring recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance).
Thus, neither federal court precedents on Fourteenth Amendment parental control rights
nor Supreme Court doctrine and state practices relating to child protection interventions and
adoption support the view that parents incapable of caring for a child themselves are entitled to
decide who replaces them when their parental status is terminated. The state is constitutionally
free to act in the way it believes most conducive to the best interests of children like A.L. and
Ta.L., according no deference to current parents’ preferences as to who adopts the children.
II.

A.L. and Ta.L. Possess a Fundamental Constitutional Right of Intimate Association
That Protects Their Relationship With A.W. and R.W.
In its decision, the division appeared to view itself as compelled to disregard the harm
that would befall the children if the trial court severed their relationship with A.W. and R.W. by
granting E.A.’s petition. In fact, constitutional rights of the children require the opposite – that
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is, that the choice between adoption petitions take fully into account the children’s profound
interest in maintaining their current family life and attachment relationships. After placing A.L.
and Ta.L. in the home and care of A.W. and R.W. and repeatedly deciding to keep the children
there, knowing that the children could over time form an attachment relationship with and
therefore psychological dependency on A.W. and R.W., the Districts’ agencies and courts may
not now treat that attachment and dependency as irrelevant to the momentous decision about the
children’s future family life. The Court is constitutionally required to give substantial weight to
a child’s long-established family relationship with foster parents, at least when the contest is not
with biological parents seeking return of the children to them but rather with other non-parents
who have filed a competing adoption petition.
All persons have a fundamental constitutional right of intimate association presumptively
protecting them against state disruption of their established family relationships and home life.
The right is not without exception, but it is among the strongest of constitutional rights. As it
applies to relationships between children and their caregivers, the interests it protects are
generally greater for the children than they are for any adults, because for children they include
fundamental aspects of development as persons. A court would therefore need truly
extraordinary justification for severing a long-term attachment relationship like the one A.L. and
Ta.L. have formed and solidified over many years in the nurturing care of A.W. and R.W.
Gratifying biological parents whose inability to care for their offspring caused them to end up
and remain for many years in foster care cannot possibly constitute such a justification.
Notably, this Court has in prior cases protected children’s existing relationship with
foster parents over competing claims by extended biological family members preferred by a
parent. See, e.g., In re T.W.M., 18 A.3d 815, 820 (D.C. 2011). Courts in other jurisdictions also
routinely consider the harm of removing children from long-term foster parents in cases of
competing adoption petitions, and some give categorical preference to long-term caregivers over
other adoption applicants. See, e.g., In re S.G., 828 N.W.2d 118, 125 (Minn. 2013) (upholding
trial court selection of foster parents rather than paternal grandparents for adoption, on the
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grounds that the statutory requirement to consider relatives first for adoption placement was
subordinate to the overarching statutory purpose to safeguard children’s best interests, which
requires taking into account harm from removing them from long-term caregivers); In re Sarah
S., 43 Cal. App. 4th 274, 285 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.,1996) (applying a statutory preference for nonparent caregivers over relatives who have not been caregivers, in choice between competing
adoption petitions, and stating that “when reunification services have been terminated, the
parents’ interests in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount,
and “the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.”).
In fact, this Court has given children in foster care such protection even when the choice
was between adoption by foster parents and preservation of a biological parent’s legal status.
See., e.g., In re C.L.O., 41 A.3d 502, 513 (D.C. 2012); In re Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670, 683
(D.C. 1993). The division’s contrary treatment of that threat to the children’s fundamental
wellbeing in this case is thus anomalous as well as unconstitutional. This Court should affirm
that in cases of this type, the potential harm to children from severing their attachment to longterm caregivers is not only an appropriate consideration, but in fact a necessary and weighty one.
This Part describes the Supreme Court’s development of the right of intimate association
in the context of relationships between adults, explains how the doctrine extends to children, and
identifies limiting principles that appropriately guide a court’s determination of whether and
when a particular foster-parent/child relationship acquires constitutional protection and what
justifications might override the presumption against state disruption of a protected relationship.
A.

The General Constitutional Right of Intimate Association

One of the most basic and important of our constitutional rights is that against state
interference in our private home and family life. The U.S. Supreme Court has “long recognized
that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the
formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure
of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
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618 (1984). The interests we have at stake in our relationship choices are so fundamental that
state policies short of preventing material harm to others cannot justify compromising our
absolute right to choose what is best for us in terms of our intimate relationships. See Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (invalidating a state’s anti-sodomy law as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment right of substantive due process); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18
(indicating that the right of intimate association, protecting from state interference “choices to
enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships,” is even stronger than the First
Amendment right of expressive association), 623 (stating that even the weaker right of
expressive association required the state to present a compelling state interest in support of an
anti-discrimination law as applied to a business- networking organization).
Accordingly, we adults have an absolute right to choose with whom we maintain
mutually voluntary friendships and intimate partnerships, on the basis of what is best for us at
any given point in time. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that antimiscegenation laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause). We adults
take for granted that no state actor could order us to end one personal relationship and form
another, regardless of how we came to know the persons with whom we choose to share a life
and regardless of what preferences other private parties might have concerning with whom we
choose to associate. Even if we met and formed a relationship with another adult only as a result
of the state’s placing us in a common living situation, the relationship would be constitutionally
protected. Cf. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that prison inmates have a
constitutional right to marry).
Related to this right to protection of relationship choices is a right against disruption of an
established household and family life. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(plurality decision) (invalidating as a violation of substantive due process a zoning provision that
would cause the breakup of a household that did not match a traditional conception of family).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated the basis for the right of intimate
association in terms of the importance of psychological and emotional bonds that form during
17
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daily association. See e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619 (“the constitutional shelter afforded such
relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment
from close ties with others.”), 619 (stating that the “personal affiliations” warranting the highest
constitutional protection “are those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family,”
including “the raising and education of children.”), 619–20 (interpreting “family” as a social
relationship, a sharing of home and daily life: “Family relationships, by their nature, involve
deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one
shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively
personal aspects of one’s life.”); Lehr at 463 U.S. 261 (“the importance of the familial
relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments
that derive from the intimacy of daily association”); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S.
816, 843 (1977) (“A biological relationship is not present in the case of the usual foster family.
But biological relationships are not exclusive determination of the existence of a family. The
basic foundation of the family in our society, the marriage relationship, is of course not a matter
of blood relation. Yet its importance has been strongly emphasized in our cases. . . . Thus the
importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from
the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it
plays in “promot(ing) a way of life” through the instruction of children. . . .”).
The constitution thus imposes severe limits on state action that would disrupt or interfere
with adults’ close personal social relationships and home life. We adults take for granted this
constitutionally-guaranteed insulation from state intrusion into our existing relationships,
whether they have been legally formalized or not. We also take for granted that we have an
absolute right to refuse any new intimate relationship that we do not want, even if it would not be
inherently harmful, and correspondingly that we cannot insist on having a family relationship
with someone who does not reciprocate our wish. The Roberts Court made the obvious point
that the right to freedom of association “plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.” Id. at
622. Thus, the state would violate this fundamental constitutional right not only by forcibly
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separating two people who are in a healthy cohabiting relationship together and want to continue,
but also by forcing a person into an intimate association he or she does not want.
B. Applying the Fundamental Right of Intimate Association to Children
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed claims on behalf of children grounded in
the right of intimate association. In Santosky the Court suggested that the child and the foster
parents might have constitutionally protected interests at stake stemming from their relationship.
455 U.S. at 754, n.7 (conceding that “important liberty interests of the child and its foster parents
may also be affected by a permanent neglect proceeding.”). In other cases, as well, some
Justices have intimated that children must, like adults, possess a constitutional right to protection
of their relationships with persons who have stood in a parental role toward them. See, e.g.,
Smith, 431 U.S. at 844 (plurality opinion) (“At least where a child has been placed in foster care
as an infant, has never known his natural parents, and has remained continuously for several
years in the care of the same foster parents, it is natural that the foster family should hold the
same place in the emotional life of the foster child, and fulfill the same socializing functions, as a
natural family. For this reason, we cannot dismiss the foster family as a mere collection of
unrelated individuals.”); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“While this Court
has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a child’s liberty interests in preserving
established familial or family-like bonds, it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent
parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships,
so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the
equation. At a minimum, our prior cases recognizing that children are, generally speaking,
constitutionally protected actors require that this Court reject any suggestion that when it comes
to parental rights, children are so much chattel.”).
It is not necessary, of course, for the Court to address constitutional claims by members
of every conceivable group before a constitutional right exists for everyone. The Court does not
need, for example, to decide a case involving an intimate partnership between two women before
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the broad right it pronounced in Lawrence applies to women in same-sex relationships. Every
person in the United States possesses a constitutional right of intimate association. And the
Supreme Court has in numerous contexts emphasized that children are persons and holders of
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (“It is not disputed that
a child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined
unnecessarily for medical treatment and that the state’s involvement in the commitment decision
constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
674 (1977) (“where school authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately decide to
punish a child for misconduct by restraining the child and inflicting appreciable physical pain,
we hold that Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests are implicated.”); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding First Amendment speech rights of public
high school students); Prince, 321 U.S. at 165-66 (1944) (referring to “rights of children to
exercise their religion”).
There is therefore no need to recognize a “new constitutional right” in order to apply in
the present case the children’s constitutional right of intimate association. That they have one is
already established, and some state courts have noted this. See, e.g., In re Jasmon O., 8 Cal. 4th
398, 419 (1994) (“Children, too, have fundamental rights-including the fundamental right to be
protected from neglect and to ‘have a placement that is stable [and] permanent.’ (Citations
omitted) Children are not simply chattels belonging to the parent, but have fundamental interests
of their own that may diverge from the interests of the parent.”); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super 76, 118 (2004) (holding in context of TPR proceeding that trial
court “erred by focusing almost solely upon the parental rights of C.S. and failed to properly
weigh and consider the rights of M.S. independent of her biological mother,” which included
protection of her relationship with the foster parent who had become her “psychological
parent”); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.F., 392 N.J. Super 201, 209-10 (App. Div.) (“A
child cannot be held prisoner of the rights of others, even those of his or her parents. Children
have their own rights, including the right to a permanent, safe and stable placement.”) (internal
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quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied, 192 N.J. 293 (2007). This court’s analysis should
begin with a recognition of this right and of the limits it imposes on what the courts may do to
A.L. and Ta.L. now that the legal tie between them and their birth parents is going to end and
they have formed a positive attachment to long-term foster parents.
In many contexts, including the present one, young children’s constitutional rights must
take a different form than those of adults. Because they are not yet capable of selfdetermination, young children have rights that are interest-protecting rather than choiceprotecting, and the rights must be given effect by a surrogate or proxy. This has been implicit in
Supreme Court decisions enforcing young children’s constitutional rights, such as Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968)
(equal protection right of illegitimate children to wrongful parental death action). The same is
true for mentally incompetent adults; they possess constitutional rights that protect their interests
when they are incapable of making autonomous choices, rights that an agent asserts in their
behalf. Their lack of autonomy does not mean a lack of constitutional rights. Cf. Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280-81, 286-87 (1990) (assessing the appropriateness of a
state’s procedures for making a substituted judgment to effectuate the constitutional right of a
person in a persistent vegetative state with respect to her medical treatment).
In the present context, where the ultimate question is who will become a child’s legal
parents after existing parents are terminated because of their incapacity to care for the child, a
court acting on its parens patriae authority must serve as the proxy decision maker, just as courts
do in post-divorce child custody disputes and in disposition hearings following findings of
maltreatment. The only reason the state may involve itself in a decision of this kind — that is,
who a person’s family members will be, which is a kind of decision the state ordinarily would
not and may not make — is that young children, like incompetent adults, need a proxy decision
maker to effectuate their constitutional right of intimate association, and the state is in the best
position to do that. Obviously, if A.L. and Ta.L. were now over eighteen, there could not
properly be any court involvement in the decision whether they stayed with A.W. and R.W. or
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instead left to live with someone else. It is the children’s need for someone to choose for them
what is best for them, and nothing else, that justifies this court’s assumption of authority over
their private lives. The trial court in this case appears to have understood that. The division’s
suggestion that the trial court should instead have exerted power over the children’s life in order
to serve the biological parents’ desires or interests is unsupportable and incompatible with the
children’s personhood and their constitutional right to a decision that is in their behalf and not
someone else’s behalf. Cf. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286-87 (rejecting contention of parents that they
possessed a right that should influence how the state makes surrogate medical care decisions for
their incapacitated adult daughter).
In other words, there is no legitimate basis for exercise of the state’s “police power”
authority in this case, basing decisions on a balancing of many people’s interests or on the basis
of collective social interests; the only proper role for the court is a parens patriae role, a role of
agent for and protector of the child. For this Court to force A.L. and Ta.L. to sacrifice their basic
welfare (by suffering the psychological damage of attachment disruption) for the sake of
gratifying other persons (birth parents who have lost custody), when it could never force any
adults to sacrifice their basic welfare in order to gratify others in a relationship-choice context,
would amount to treating the children as less than equal persons. It would demean and insult
them, treating them more like things than like fully human individuals. It would be morally
unprincipled and in direct conflict with the broad purpose of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ Due Process Clause “‘to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government.’” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
C. Limiting Principles in Foster Care Situations
The foregoing does not amount to saying that a child’s relationship with foster parents
becomes constitutionally protected the moment children are placed in foster care, nor that when
constitutional protection does materialize the state can never have legitimate justification for
ending a child’s relationship with foster parents.
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Foster care placements are generally presumed at the outset to be temporary, because the
state’s aim is usually to make it possible for the child safely to return to parental custody. Cf.
Smith, 431 U.S. at 844-46 (1977). In part because of that shared understanding, foster parents
might never bond with a child and a child might never attach to the foster parents. If an
attachment relationship does develop, it will not do so quickly; attachment is a lengthy process.
So too with children’s becoming psychologically dependent upon, and settled into a family life
with, foster parents. Relationships between children and caregivers solidify, if at all, only after
an extended period of time, at least many months and sometimes only after years. Cf.
Guardianship of Ann S., 45 Cal. 4th 1110, 1136 (2009) (“After years of guardianship, the child
has a fully developed interest in a stable, continuing, and permanent placement with a fully
committed caregiver. The guardian, after fulfilling a parental role for an extended period, has
also developed substantial interests that the law recognizes.”). Even if a child spends a long time
in foster care, attachment to the foster parents might never occur if the child entered foster care
already relatively old or developmentally damaged by maltreatment, or if the foster parents are
not especially nurturing.
However, if as in this case, after a lengthy period of receiving nurturing care from and
sharing a family life with foster parents, a child does develop a positive attachment to the foster
parents, documented by a child psychologist trained to assess attachment, then the child will at
that point have a sufficiently strong interest in maintaining the relationship that courts should
deem the child constitutionally entitled to remain in that relationship absent legitimate and
compelling countervailing considerations. Certainly it would be indefensible for a court to sever
the relationship without giving substantial weight to the likely harm that disrupting the
attachment would cause the child. Once a positive attachment forms, the child’s fundamental
wellbeing can depend on continuing the relationship through childhood, because disrupting
attachment relationships is, as the experts testified at trial, typically quite damaging to a child.
Certainly the child then has, as a factual matter, far greater interests at stake than does any adult
in the decision whether the foster parents rather than someone else will adopt him or her.
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As with most constitutional rights, the right of intimate association is not absolute. With
adults, permissible bases for infringing the right are quite limited. Cf. Overton v. Bazetta, 539
U.S. 126 (2003) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to prison regulations restricting visitation).
With children, there is in connection with this right, as with other constitutional rights of
children, reasonable basis for overriding the right on paternalistic grounds – that is, for the sake
of serving interests of the children that are even more important to their well-being in their
particular circumstances. Such other interests could include an interest in resuming a
relationship with birth parents, if the birth parents are presently capable of providing adequate
care. In a case like the present one, once it is settled that adoption is the permanency plan for a
child and that birth parents’ rights will be terminated, that interest is not present.
There could be other considerations counting against maintaining a relationship with
foster parents, ones applicable even when return to birth parents is no longer contemplated. For
example, new circumstances could develop in the foster home that present a danger for the child.
A court considering alternative adoption petitions can consider any such facts relevant to the
child’s wellbeing. What it may not do constitutionally is to disregard the child’s strong interest
in preserving and continuing the home life and family relationships they have developed with
nurturing caregivers. The upshot of recognizing that at some point a child’s relationship with
foster parents can become so well developed and important to a child’s wellbeing that it becomes
constitutionally protected is simply to require that the court resolving the adoption dispute apply
a presumption against severing the attachment relationship, give substantial weight to the child’s
interest in maintaining that relationship, and impose on the competing adoption applicant the
burden of demonstrating that other child welfare considerations outweigh the harm the court
would cause the child by ending the relationship with the foster parents.
This Court must squarely address this constitutional right of A.L. and Ta.L. Young
children cannot assert this right themselves the way competent adults do; they need a proxy
decision maker to act in their behalf. Courts respect and effectuate this constitutional right by
making decisions for a child at any given time based on a rational, evidence-based determination
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of what will be best for them in light of their present circumstances, just as adults are entitled to
choose their family relationships based on what is best for them. As an empirical matter,
protecting a child’s attachment relationships is presumptively best for them. This is essentially
what this Court has done in prior cases it could now solidify this approach, and avoid a repeat of
the division’s anomalous and potentially harmful treatment of these vulnerable children, by
explicitly recognizing that judicial respect for children’s attachment relationships is not
gratuitous on the courts’ part but rather something to which children are constitutionally entitled.
CONCLUSION
Neither E.A. nor the biological parents can plausibly claim any constitutional right to the
result they prefer. A.L. and Ta.L., on the other hand, have a constitutional right that
presumptively precludes the District and its courts from destroying the attachment relationship
they have formed over many years with A.W. and R.W. To justify infringing that right, a court
must find that other, countervailing child welfare considerations are weightier.
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